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INTRODUCTION
Deliberation is one of the most important tasks in any arbitral
procedure. It is therefore important to define the term “deliberation.”
According to the Oxford Dictionary, this term indicates the process
of carefully considering or discussing something. The term
deliberation is broad; it does not indicate any specific stage of the
proceedings.

* This lecture is an adaptation of an article presented by the lecturer in the
GLOBAL REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMERCE AND DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: LIBER AMICORUM IN HONOUR OF ROBERT BRINER 221 (Gerald
Aksen ed., 2005).
** Former Secretary General of the Court of Arbitration of the International
Chamber of Commerce.
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Thus, concerning arbitrator’s deliberation, it would be wrong to
think that only the final award should be the subject of deliberation.
The Tribunal’s obligation of deliberation is not limited to the issue of
an award. In fact, most of the time the Arbitral Tribunal is obliged to
take several procedural decisions before the case is ready to be
decided.1 These decisions are also subject to deliberation no matter if
they qualify as an award or merely as an act of procedural
administration.
Except in cases where the parties have conferred upon the
President the power to act alone, the decisions of the Arbitral
Tribunal are always preceded by a deliberation of its members. In
practice, it rarely occurs that a President is authorized to decide
alone, except to grant extensions of time or to rule on minor issues,
especially during the hearing. Even when the parties grant such
power to the President, they will often specify that this faculty has to
be exercised after consulting the co-arbitrators, which itself amounts
to requiring some form of deliberation. The above confirms that
deliberation begins when the Arbitral Tribunal comes into action
because, most of the time, the Arbitral Tribunal cannot act without
previous deliberation.
It is worth questioning the nature of deliberation. Initially, it has
been suggested that deliberations were a right of the parties derived
from their right to be heard and their right to equal treatment.2 As it
has been rightly pointed out, this view seems incompatible with the
requirement of independence of the arbitrators.3
It has also been suggested that the arbitrator’s duty of deliberation
is based on international public policy.4 This is undoubtedly the case,
1.I.e. Decisions on jurisdiction, admissibility or prescription of the parties’ claims,
the validity of the contract, the principle of responsibility. The question of whether
or not these decisions have to be considered as simply preliminary decisions or as
arbitral awards properly speaking is discussed in comparative law. Cf. PIERRE
LALIVE, JEAN-FRANÇOIS POUDRET, & CLAUDE REYMOND, LE DRIOT DE
L’ARBITRAGE ET INTERNATIONAL EN SUISSE 406-07 (1989). However, the fact that
these decisions have to be subject to deliberation is widely accepted.
2. JEAN-FRANÇOIS POUDRET & SEBASTIEN BESSON, DRIOT COMPARE DE
L’ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL 689 (2002). It is not certain that these two authors
share the same opinion on this subject.
3. In this sense, FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 746 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999).
4. In this sense, M. DE BOISSÉSON, LE DROIT FRANÇAIS DE L’ARBITRAGE
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not, as has been put forward by some commentators that the only
purpose of deliberations is the observation of the rights of defense,5
but rather because in the absence of deliberation, the decision would
not be taken by the Tribunal but by one or two individuals abusing of
the power conferred to them as members of the Tribunal.6
In practice, the arbitrator’s deliberation is closely linked to the
partiality or impartiality of the members of the Arbitral Tribunal.
Unfortunately, partial arbitrators are more common than one might
anticipate and, although they tend to be the exception, in particular
with the progress of a true arbitral culture, when arbitrators
deliberate, they must be conscious of this harsh reality to avoid
disillusion of the Tribunal at the time of deliberation.7
Thus, in the practice of arbitrator’s deliberation one can
distinguish two types: harmonious deliberation and pathologic
deliberation. This distinction has mainly a pedagogical purpose. In
the practice of arbitration proceedings, it is often at an advanced
stage of the proceedings that the President is able to make an opinion
about the impartiality or the partiality of his or her colleagues. It is
undeniable that some arbitrators are known to be assistants to the
party that appointed them.8 On the other hand, there is an elite corps
of international arbitrators whose reputation and independence is
established already. Jan Paulson, in a remarkable article,9 invited
every member of the arbitrator profession to join this group. An
arbitrator who usually sits with either kind of arbitrator knows what
to expect from each one of them, but except for these special

INTERNE ET INTERNATIONAL 801 (1990); see also Phillippe Fouchard, Commentary
on the Judgment of the Cour de Cassation, 2e Civ., January 28, 1981, 1982 REVUE
DE L’ARBITRAGE 425 (1982).
5. M. DE BOISSESON, supra note 4.
6. For this reason, it is hard to share the view of J.-F. Poudret and S. Besson,
according to which when the arbitrator appointed by a party has no opportunity to
participate in deliberations, the principle of equality of the parties is breached to
the detriment of that party. Indeed, both parties have an identical right to the
decision is taken by the Arbitral Tribunal conceived as a whole.
7. Compare, inter alia, Emmanuel Gaillard, Les manœuvres dilatoires des
parties et des arbitres dans l’arbitrage commercial international, 1990 REVUE DE
L’ARBITRAGE 756 (1990).
8. Jean-Denis Bredin, Retour au délibéré arbitral, in LIBER AMICORUM
CLAUDE REYMOND 43-50 (2004).
9. Jean Paulsson, Ethics, Elitism, Eligibility, 14 J. INT’L ARB. 13 (1997).
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circumstances, it is often during the procedure that arbitrators get to
know each other beyond superficial relationships developed at
arbitration conferences.
The result thereof is that the so-called pathologic deliberation
influences the general practice of deliberation. The duration of
deliberations is extremely variable and most of the time it depends
on the speed with which the arbitrators verify the impartiality of their
colleagues. In exceptional circumstances this verification can be
immediate, and generally occurs in cases where the arbitrators have
sat together before. If this is not the case, the arbitrators, and
especially the President will take precautions from the beginning of
the procedure in order to avoid the risks of a pathologic deliberation,
at least until he or she is convinced of the uselessness of these
measures.10 This observation makes even more sense as it has been
asserted that deliberation begins when the tribunal comes into
action.11
Thus, in general terms, deliberation — the one preceding the final
award and that some purists might call strictly “deliberation”— is
actually the final stage of ongoing relations between the members of
the Arbitral Tribunal. Depending on the partiality or impartiality of
the members of the Tribunal, it can be (I) pathologic or (II)
harmonious.

I. THE PATHOLOGIC DELIBERATION
A deliberation can be qualified as being “pathologic” when an
arbitrator (or even two arbitrators12) does not make decisions based
10. Claude Reymond, Le Président du Tribunal Arbitral, in ETUDES OFFERTES
465-76 (Pierre Bellet ed., 1991).
11. In this sense see ANDREAS REINER, HANDBUCH DER ICCSCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT 251-252 (1989); Reymond, supra note 10, at 478;
Bredin, supra note 8, at 48.
12. To the extent that the President has no link with the parties, in principle it is
not conceivable that he or she may adopt such an attitude. However, this situation
should not be completely dismissed, given that the President can eventually take
procedural measures taking into account only his or her own available time, either
because he or she wishes to accelerate the procedure to get rid of it as soon as
possible, or on the contrary, seeks to slow it up in favor of activities that can be
considered more urgent. A case has been known where a President had insisted on
a relatively late date for a hearing because he wanted to be at the place of
arbitration for personal reasons at this specific date.

A PIERRE BELLET,
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on an objective analysis of the issues submitted to the Tribunal but
rather on a personal interest more or less disguised.
Too often, the interest of the arbitrator is to favor the party that has
appointed him, either by endorsing all those party’s positions or,
more rarely, by suggesting creative and favorable solutions when he
considers that such party is poorly advised by its counsel.
Although both situations are harmful, the first of them can be
considered as mere inaction while the second, more disloyal and
more destructive of the integrity of the procedure, is clearly collusion
between the arbitrator and the party. In this second case, the
arbitrator plays a role of informant, regularly informing that party of
the facts, actions, of concerns but especially of draft decisions of the
Arbitral Tribunal. Worse still, it may happen that following the
party’s interests, the arbitrator tries to delay the procedure purporting
to have a busy schedule that prevents him or her from participating in
the meetings or refusing to deliberate by correspondence or, more
severely, by resigning.
These are just classic examples of what may be called ‘arbitral
terrorism’ because the partial arbitrator who commits such excesses
has no other purpose but to obstruct the arbitration.
In general terms, a pathologic deliberation entails two risks: (1)
the breach of the principle of confidentiality of deliberations, and (2)
the sabotage of the arbitration proceedings.

A. THE BREACH OF THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF DELIBERATIONS
As has been previously suggested, one cannot consider that the
principle of equality of the parties is breached when an arbitrator
appointed by one of the parties does not participate in deliberations.
However, the breach of the confidentiality of deliberations in favor
of one of the parties is clearly a breach of this principle, which is
considered by some legislation as a general principle arising from
procedural public policy.13 In fact, the party that has been informed
by one of the arbitrators of the developments of the reasoning of the
Arbitral Tribunal, of the questions arising inside the Tribunal, or of
the strengths and weaknesses that arbitrators perceive from the
13. E.g., Société Fougerolle v. Société Procofrance, Cour d’appel de Paris,
May 25, 1990, 1990 REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE 892 (1990).
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parties’ submissions, can improperly take advantage of the received
information in order to adapt its procedural strategy accordingly.
Therefore, this party may improperly be advantaged over its
counterparty due to these leaks in information.
When this kind of breach occurs after the closure of debates and
before the issue of the award by the Arbitral Tribunal, it is equally or
more harmful for the other party, since it confers on the informed
party a privileged position in the search for an amicable solution to
the dispute. The party informed by an insider within the Arbitral
Tribunal that a certain amount is to be awarded to its counterparty
will often make strong attempts to reach a settlement for an amount
inferior to that which otherwise it would be condemned. This is the
reason why the settlements that occur when the Tribunal has already
made a decision and when the award is being drafted creates an
unhealthy climate between the members of the Tribunal: two of the
members inevitably suspect the third one to have participated in what
can only be called fraud and unfortunately, most of the time, these
suppositions are well founded.
The fear of a possible breach of the principle of confidentiality by
one of the members of the Tribunal is the source of a regrettable lack
of spontaneity therein. When arbitrators are unsure of the impartiality
of their colleagues, each of them refrains from discussing the merits
of the case before it is absolutely necessary in order to make a final
decision. In some cases, the arbitrators are not obliged to discuss the
merits until the moment of deliberations of the final award. At this
point, everyone is forced to reveal his or her opinions and propose
possible solutions relying on the arguments used in order to support
each solution. At this moment, the risk of a breach of the principle of
confidentiality of deliberations is no longer avoidable, but at least the
principle of equality of the parties has been respected so far in the
procedure. If at this point the parties engage in settlement
negotiations, even if they know that the final award is being
deliberated and drafted, it is each party’s responsibility to assess the
information provided by its counterparty and the risk of leakage by
one of the members of the Tribunal.
However, the damaging effects of this lack of spontaneity in the
relationships between the arbitrators will be measured in the second
part of this article, where the benefits of a harmonious deliberation
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are highlighted, which may only happen when complete trust exists
between the members of the Tribunal.
In order to have a harmonious deliberation, the experienced
arbitrators try to test the degree of impartiality of their colleagues as
soon as possible, generally, from the beginning of the procedure.
Thus, the President will try to test the arbitrators’ impartiality, and
each arbitrator will try to test his or her co-arbitrator’s impartiality.
In most arbitral procedures this observation period does not last
very long: usually since the first meeting of the arbitral tribunal with
the parties whose purpose is to organize the procedure and, under
ICC arbitration, since the signature of the terms or reference, it is
possible to recognize if deliberations are going to be pathologic or
harmonious. Indeed, if one of the arbitrators or both of them adopt
without hesitation the procedural position of the party that has
appointed them, without objectively and rationally assessing such
positions, one can expect that deliberations will be pathologic. On
the contrary, if the co-arbitrators make constructive proposals, taking
into account the nature of the problems to be resolved, the
atmosphere inside the Tribunal quickly relaxes because each of the
members begin to form the impression of belonging to a
homogeneous jurisdiction whose sole purpose is to join efforts in
order to reach an impartial solution.
However, this first impression may not match with reality, as some
partial but experienced arbitrators, perfectly distinguishing between
the accessory character of certain procedural confrontations and
some more important issues with effects on the merits of the case,
may not adopt the position of the party who appointed them at this
first stage of the proceedings and rather reserve their partiality for
substantial issues. Nevertheless, this situation rarely occurs and in
order to benefit from the advantages of the harmonious deliberations,
their colleagues will have the natural tendency to uphold the
presumption of good faith in light of the positive results of this
preliminary survey. Although the risk of leaks in information is less
important, it is recommended not to commence dialogue on the
merits at this stage of the procedure because this information may be
used to the detriment of one of the parties. If after this first part of the
procedure the co-arbitrators continue to demonstrate the same degree
of impartiality, the harmonious deliberation may be considered as
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acquired; otherwise, it is better to bear in mind the aforementioned
precautions.

B. SABOTAGE OF THE ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
The second risk arising from a pathologic deliberation is that the
President cannot count on the participation of his or her colleagues to
draft the award. In fact, if the President chooses to distribute the
work among members of the Tribunal in order to allow that each
arbitrator drafts one part of the award, there is a risk that the product
of that work is useless. If, on the contrary, the President chooses to
hold a meeting prior to discussion, which generally occurs and
whose purpose is to question the co-arbitrators on their respective
positions, he or she can conclude that the decisions cannot be taken
by mutual agreement but by majority or only by him or herself. This
situation is not dangerous per se. What becomes really dangerous is
that, irrespective of the method used, once the positions of the
arbitrators are known they then crystallize. From that moment on, the
arbitration procedure is exposed to the risk mentioned above, i.e.
arbitral terrorism. Indeed, although some arbitration rules allow the
award to be made by majority or by the President only,14 the
procedure can still be blocked by the resignation of one of the
arbitrators, since the award is not completely drafted at this stage of
the procedure.15 A deliberation on the final text of the award is
necessary in order to complete deliberations and this necessity is, as
it has been rightly pointed out,16 the “Achilles heel of the collegiate
jurisdiction.”
It is recommended to every President of an Arbitral Tribunal,
conscious of the possibility of having a pathologic deliberation, to set
a meeting for deliberation where he or she submits a draft decision
and discusses with the co-arbitrators its content page by page,
discussing each point subject to a decision and submitting to vote not
only the content of the decision but also the text of the document.
The Minutes of this meeting must be kept showing each vote. It is
14. As is the case of ICC Arbitration Rules, Article 25(1).
15. Solutions such as that embodied in article 12 (5) of the ICC Rules, which,
under some conditions, allows the two remaining arbitrators to issue the award
cope with this problem.
16. Cf. Dominique Hascher, Principes et pratique de procédure dans
l’arbitrage commercial international, 179 RCADI 51, 162 (1999).
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true that these procedures constitute extra work for the President but
collegiality must not be sacrificed for efficiency. For this reason, the
interest to reach a decision shall not prevail over the duty of
deliberation. The confrontation of ideas, even with a partial
arbitrator, is always beneficial. Most times, it gives the President an
opportunity to reinforce the motivation he or she wished to adopt in
view of opposite considerations. Sometimes, the deliberation led to
the change of his or her initial position on certain points, especially
when one of the co-arbitrators is truly independent; that is to say, in
most cases. More importantly, the President must not to forget that in
a complex case, a co-arbitrator, even if partial, can be right about
some points and at the same time refuse to acknowledge that the
party that appointed him or her has no valid grounds behind other
points. For this reason, deliberation must not be underestimated, but
the President has to be aware of its limits. When the two coarbitrators are partial, which is quite rare, deliberations result in
different majorities concerning each claim, because each arbitrator
will make the decision that most favors the party that appointed him
or her. In these cases, the President shall decide alone, when it is so
allowed by the arbitration rules applicable to the case. Nevertheless,
this is quite exceptional, because the President will try to persuade
the co-arbitrators in order to make a collegiate decision.
Whatever the case is, the point is not to conclude the deliberation
session without having an agreed draft of the award that is the result
of the vote of the members of the Tribunal. When the complexity of
the case requires devoting several days for deliberation, the President
must not hesitate to do so in order to have, at the end of deliberation,
a draft of the award that has been completely voted by all members
of the Tribunal. When this is done, the terrorist arbitrators are
considerably limited in their attempts to jeopardize the procedure.

II. THE HARMONIOUS DELIBERATION
In general terms, one can say that harmony exists whenever there
is an absolute trust between the members of the Arbitral Tribunal.
This trust is simply the consequence of the impartiality of the
members of the Tribunal. When the members of the Tribunal are
absolutely impartial, harmony flows naturally.
Once (1) it has been determined that a deliberation can be
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qualified as being harmonious, (2) one should concentrate on the
risks of this kind of deliberation, and (3) finally address the issue of
the deliberation by the sole arbitrator.

A. THE DEFINITION AND FORM OF HARMONIOUS DELIBERATION
It is not easy to define harmonious deliberation because no two
harmonious deliberations are ever the same. When the members of
the Arbitral Tribunal know each other and appreciate each other, the
harmony is gained from the time the Tribunal is established. In this
case, the arbitrators do not hesitate to share their views of the case
over telephone conversations or whenever they meet, whether in
arbitral proceedings or in other circumstances. These exchanges are
extremely rich because they allow each member’s views to form and
become stronger. However, without being overly formalistic, the
President must nevertheless make sure that any significant comment
on the conduct of the proceedings and a fortiori on the merits of the
case expressed in an informal conversation between two members of
the Tribunal is immediately shared with the third member. Besides
this particular situation, harmony within the Arbitral Tribunal
develops gradually, just as the sound of an orchestra is formed only
after each musician plays a few isolated musical syllables to tune his
or her instrument to that of others.
However, harmony should not be confused with unison. In
international matters, arbitrators often belong to different legal
traditions. One consequence of this is that each arbitrator may have
different views not only on the conduct of the proceedings but also in
the analysis of contractual provisions. In addition, arbitrators may
have a different perception of business relationships or of human
relations. Moreover, a harmonious deliberation is not a deliberation
dominated by a permanent unanimity: it is not necessary that the
members of the Tribunal belong to the same legal system to have the
same conception about the conduct of the proceedings or about the
solution of the dispute. There are confrontations even under
harmonious deliberation, sometimes very difficult confrontations.
But the difference between pathologic and harmonious deliberation
is that in the latter, the differences of opinions between the arbitrators
are the result of personal convictions by each of them and not simply
the reflection of the position of the parties. It would be wrong to
believe that harmonious deliberation always leads to agreements
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between the members of the Tribunal, although in most cases the
award is unanimous. Indeed, this unanimity may be just a façade,
because it may be that the decision has been taken by majority, but
the dissenting arbitrator may consider that it is not useful to inform
the parties of his or her disagreement. This situation suggests that
harmonious deliberations may also entail some risks.

B. RISKS OF HARMONIOUS DELIBERATION
When the decision is taken by majority despite the disagreement
of one of the members of the Tribunal, the fact that this arbitrator
does not wish to publicly express his or her opposition to the solution
adopted by the majority of the arbitral tribunal does not pose a
problem in itself. Moreover, this is consistent with the tradition of
some countries where the Tribunal is considered as an entity rather
than a sum of individuals. However, this interest not to reveal to the
parties the differences of opinions among the arbitrators should not
be transformed, in the name of harmony, into a desire to find at any
price a solution that will satisfy all the members of the Tribunal.
Indeed, arbitrators shall make the decision imposed by the law or by
fairness, if they are to act as amiables compositeurs. This duty must
prevail over any other concern. The arbitrators’ duty is to render
justice and not to please one and other. If two arbitrators are unable
to convince the third of the validity of the solution proposed by them
and the error of his or her position, the majority must prevail and no
haggling to reach unanimity is acceptable. The deliberation is not a
negotiation.
Contrary to pathologic deliberation, the harmonious deliberation
does not require the President to take special precautions regarding
the procedure for making a collegiate decision. In most cases, this
procedure is defined during the proceedings. As noted, the position
of each member of the Arbitral Tribunal is outlined during informal
discussions, and they develop with the reading of the parties’
submissions and especially during the hearing of some witnesses
and, sometimes, of experts. During the proceedings, the arbitrators
have discussed the key issues raised by the case and, at the end of the
proceedings; they are superficially familiar with the other’s
respective viewpoints. On this basis, and after a discussion in which
the positions of each arbitrator is confirmed and deepened, the
President may then easily propose to the co-arbitrators a working
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method that can vary according to various elements: identity or
diversity of viewpoints inside the Tribunal, workload of each of the
members, interest of either of them in a particular issue, etc. In a
complex case, the President may establish a list of questions that
each arbitrator may answer or split between them the drafting of the
award. However, it is more common, and probably more desirable so
as to have a unity of style, that the President prepares a draft of the
award alone, even if one or several notes of the co-arbitrators are
incorporated later into the original draft. In these cases, a further
meeting is rarely necessary because refining the text of the award
may be carried out by correspondence or during a conference call.

C. THE DELIBERATION BY THE SOLE ARBITRATOR
These few reflections on arbitrator’s deliberation cannot be
concluded without talking of the most harmonious, but especially the
most difficult form of deliberation: the deliberation by the sole
arbitrator. If the deliberation is the conscious and thoughtful
examination of the case before deciding whether to perform or not an
act conceived as possible, there is no doubt that the sole arbitrator, in
his or her solitude, deliberates. However, caution should bear borne
here also as this process involves its own dangers. The absence of
confrontation does not only entail the risk of prejudging but also the
risk of being superficial. Indeed, the member of an Arbitral Tribunal
who has to convince the other members of the validity of his or her
analysis is obliged to examine all aspects of the case to find the
evidence and arguments that support his or her position. The sole
arbitrator must act in the same way in order to properly fulfill its
mission; the problem is that it is only the desire to act in this way that
will force him or her to do so. The sole arbitrator must adopt the
perspective of each party and evaluate in light of each of them, the
possibility to make an award that satisfies the law, or, where
appropriate, equity. However, this task is far from being easy and the
sole arbitrator should not rely too much on help from associates or
relatives to fulfill this obligation. Indeed, they do not have sufficient
knowledge of the case to have a totally independent view, and their
view is always influenced by the sole arbitrator’s view, which is
necessarily based on its first impressions. For this reason, the sole
arbitrator shall, under no circumstance, be tempted to escape from
his or her isolation.
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CONCLUSION
These observations on the deliberation of the sole arbitrator lead to
the conclusion that a collegiate deliberation, whether harmonious or
pathologic, must always coordinate with the personal deliberation of
each member of the Arbitral Tribunal. For this reason, before
confronting each arbitrator’s analysis with those of his or her
colleagues, an arbitrator must have his own internal deliberation and
must analyze the arguments of each party with the greatest openmindedness. Thus, the arbitrator must do so by assuming in turn that
the party which he or she examines the theory is right. Once both
positions have been properly analyzed he or she may make a
decision, while recognizing that this decision is tentative, as an
arbitrator must debate with his or her colleagues before making a
final decision.

